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We have developed a new dataset of national energy expenditures covering more than 30 countries 
since the early 1970s, complemented by longer-term (65-year) data for the US.  From this we explore 
more robustly the hypothesis of long-term constancy in energy expenditure relative to GDP advanced 
by Bashmakov (2007) and also implied in research by Newbery (2003).  We explore patterns over time 
and the critical ranges, and consider various interpretations and implications. 
We find strong evidence to support a constrained range of long-run energy expenditures relative 
to GDP (“relative energy expenditures”), across time and countries: an observation which equates 
to an approximately “-1” relationship between energy price and energy intensity (E/GDP ratio). We 
demonstrate that timescales of adjustment however are long – in the region of 25-30 years for one 
cycle of energy prices, with the relationship most stable over periods approaching 50 years which 
equate to two full cycles. The stable range of energy expenditure we find to be 8±2 percent of GDP.  
We discuss the close relationship of this to long-run elasticity of energy intensity with respect to end-user 
prices.  A constant level of energy expenditure, ceteris paribus, would imply an elasticity of (minus)1 – 
considerably higher than classical time-series measures of energy demand- price elasticity (which point 
to long-run elasticities of (minus) 0.6-0.7 at most). 
Indeed, we find that the cross-country correlation of energy price to energy intensity appears greater 
than (minus) 1 thus, countries with higher average energy overall prices since the 1970s have actually 
spent less of their income on energy, whilst those which maintained lower prices have spent more. 
Across the full dataset the implied value is almost (minus) 1.5. This includes significant influence from 
exceptional conditions in a few eastern European countries, which kept prices low for much of the 
period and developed extremely inefficient economies, but which then faced rapid increases as they 
joined the EU at a time of rising global energy prices. Even excluding these the cross-country correlation 
remains greater than (minus) 1. 
With the longer US dataset, on a basis of purely territorial energy consumption, there is evidence of a 
slow decline in energy cost share. We draw on trade statistics to estimate the impact of the US’ shift 
from being a net exporter to net importer of energy intensive goods, and show that by taking account 
of this – i.e. shifting to a net consumption basis – the slow decline in US energy-related expenditure 
would reduce and may disappear, implying an even more constant typical expenditure over the 65 year 
period.  We surmise that treating cross-country expenditures on a similar consumption basis would 
also bring observed relative energy expenditures back towards constancy. Trade effects are far from 
the dominant cause of higher energy prices being correlated with lower energy expenditures, but rather, 
accounting for them suggests an even closer ‘-1’ constancy of relative energy expenditures. 
We then consider various theories to account for the observed rough constancy of energy expenditure, 
showing that it is inconsistent with the normal assumption of a fixed (and relatively low) price elasticity 
of energy demand.  Rather, it seems to reflect different ‘elastic phases’ of response, according to the 
price levels, affordability thresholds, and price trends, and which appear to have a substantial degree 
of path-dependence. We show how this can potentially be related to the ‘Three Domains’ framework 
advanced by Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff (2014, 2015), with shifts of energy price regimes changing 
the relative importance in different domains of response.
We explore other (potentially related) theories that could explain the observations. These include: 
• Theoretical reasons why multi-stage energy systems would ultimately tend towards a price elasticity 
of demand of “-1”, and how - given inertia in some of the intermediate stages – such systems could 
generate even greater long-run responsiveness to energy price variations, as observed in our cross-
country studies;
• The observation that energy prices are regressive, and that lower income groups facing higher energy 
costs tend to be more price responsive; a general increase in energy prices would then increase 
the overall national response. Yet simply imposing higher prices can carry a significant welfare cost 
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particularly on poorer households.
Finally, we touch on potential policy implications, of which we pinpoint three main ones: 
• First, the data clearly imply that energy systems have a large capacity to adapt to higher prices and 
other pressures, given time. There is no particular reason to believe for example that low carbon energy 
systems will ultimately increase energy expenditures.
• Second, practical policy can only deliver such transformations through the use of multiple policies 
spanning energy efficiency, environmental pricing, and direct investment in innovation and infrastructure. 
The energy transformations visible in the data we have covered (notably oil shocks and integration 
of eastern Europe) were externally driven, and involved large social and economic dislocations; it is 
doubtful whether any elected political system could drive  equivalent transformations using price alone. 
• Third, consequently, the normal economic logic that high environmental pricing should be the best 
instrument to drive transformation may need inverting: rather energy efficiency (in particular) can be 
viewed as a social policy, of which the environmental co-benefits will be undermined by rebound effects, 
unless it is accompanied by rising energy prices, so as to keep overall costs within the Bashmakov-
Newbery constant of energy expenditure. To combine regulatory certainty with flexibility, it is also 
possible that price-based instruments (such as fuel duties or environmental pricing) could be designed 
with escalators that are automatically paused if expenditure thresholds are exceeded, and resume 
when expenditure falls.  
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Introduction
Energy costs are politically sensitive, and resistance to energy price rises is a major impediment to 
economically efficient energy pricing, including subsidy removal and incorporating the external costs 
associated with the environmental impacts of energy use.  Political debate in most countries has largely 
equated energy prices and energy bills: if energy prices go up, then, common sense suggests, bills 
must do too.
In this paper, we critically examine the extent to which this assumption holds true. Noting that energy 
bills are a product both of energy prices and of levels of energy consumption, we focus on the long-
run and cross-country evidence concerning the response of energy intensity and energy demand to 
energy prices – in economic terms, the elasticity of energy intensity with respect to final energy price. 
We explore this both through a critical review of the existing econometrics literature, and through 
development and use of a new international dataset on energy costs. 
The divergence in energy prices between different countries is often associated with comparative 
advantage, not just specifically concerning key sectors, but more generally on the presumption that 
higher energy prices equate to countries bearing a higher deadweight cost of energy provision. Our 
analysis also sheds light on this, noting the evidence on the economic impacts of extreme prices, but 
illustrating also that these periods appear to drive important structural adjustments and innovation, 
which help to bring bills back down and may contribute to renewed growth.
We examine the issue from a standpoint characterised by: 
• a long-term and cross-country perspective 
• a national focus, but with some exploration of sectoral components 
• a focus on energy intensity – energy demand per unit of GDP – rather than energy demand itself
• large-scale energy price changes, rather than estimation of elasticities in response to marginal 
price changes
Thus, our analysis is focused on the enduring impact of final consumption energy price changes (after 
taxes and subsidies) on overall energy bills, as a proportion of income, particularly at the national level. 
Our conclusion is striking: at a sufficient level of aggregation, the proportionate energy bill – the share of 
income expended on energy – varies within a range far more narrow than the variation of energy prices. 
Expenditure on energy gravitates back towards similar levels even with extreme energy prices, given 
time, and to levels that are similar across countries, irrespective of long-run energy prices.  
In aggregate we estimate, correspondingly, that this equates to a long-run price elasticity of energy 
intensity of about “-1”. This suggests that the phenomena observed is in fact more subtle than a 
constant long-run elasticity of demand, but rather involves different ‘elastic phases’, with differing 
elasticities, and with the overall pattern being characterised by non-linearities in transitions between 
such phases.  From this observation, finally we also draw theoretical and policy conclusions.
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Part I: Concepts and existing literature
There is an extensive literature exploring the elasticity of energy demand, and energy intensity, to energy 
prices, from which this brief section will identify a selected number of studies to establish the key 
concerns of this paper.
 (a) Consumer energy demand price elasticities 
Although studies produce a relatively wide range of results (Labandeira, Labeaga & Lopez-Otero, 
2015), a common conclusion is that energy demand is relatively price inelastic. Labandeira et al (2015) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 416 papers produced between 1990 and 2014, which provided 951 
short-term and 991 long-term estimates of price elasticity for different energy products, sectors and 
countries.  After correction to allow for cross-study comparability, they find average price elasticities of 
(total) energy demand to be -0.22 in the short-term and -0.6 to -0.66 in the long-term. 
Of course there is no definitive standard of what ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ mean – though typical 
interpretations point to ‘a few years’ and ‘up to a few decades’ respectively. Given the vast range of 
existing studies of consumer energy price demand elasticities we do not further review these studies, 
but focus rather on the dynamics, cross-country-evidence, and long term – up to about 50 years, for 
reasons indicated in our data analysis.  
The issue of timescales is fundamental to our analysis. Attempts to estimate price elasticities over even 
longer periods run into increasing data problems (as well as larger exogenous changes), but a few 
studies have tried: 
• At a sector level, studies of UK transport over 150 years by Fouquet & Pearson (2012), and of 
lighting over 200 years, estimated that price elasticities had declined somewhat over the period but had 
been relatively stable since 1990, at around -0.6 for transport and -0.7 for lighting, which the authors 
considered ‘very large’ compared to previous, shorter-term estimates.
• Stern and Kander (2012) used 200 years of Swedish data to look at whole economy elasticity, and 
estimate substitution elasticities in a similar range (0.65 – 0.69).   
A recent contribution by Saunders (2015) builds on these estimates into a theoretical framework to 
examine implications for ‘rebound’.  Our concern in this paper is with the apparent relationship between 
these varied elasticity estimates and overall national energy expenditures over multi-decadal timescales, 
and we return to consider these literature estimates after developing our own analysis. 
 (b) Income elasticities 
The other factor that would affect energy expenditure as a proportion of income is of course income 
elasticity. At the level of different income groups it is well established that energy prices are regressive 
(poorer people spend a higher proportion of income on energy – a well-known fact which turns out to 
have some significant implications for interpreting our findings in this paper as indicated in Part V). 
The literature on income elasticity of energy demand is also well developed, and concludes growth in 
income is positively, and strongly, correlated to growth in energy consumption. 
This includes some very long run studies. Fouquet (2014) summarises the early empirical evidence. He 
illustrates the case of studies in Britain in the 1790s, which found that households generally spent about 
5% of their income on fuel.This result was corroborated first by Engel (1857, cited by Fouquet, 2014) 
who found, when examining changes in expenditure and consumption as incomes rise among Belgian 
workmen in the 1850s, that the share of income allocated to fuel and lighting remained at around 
5% across the income levels studied, and later (in 1875) by a study of households in Massachusetts, 
which found that ‘the percentage of outlay for…fuel and light, is invariably the same [6%], whatever the 
income’ (see Stigler, 1954, p.99-100). Such early results suggest that the income elasticity of energy 
demand is largely unitary.
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This view is broadly supported by more recent, economy-wide, cross-country, studies. Newbery 
(2003), when examining the evolution of energy use in relation to real GDP (i.e. country-level income) 
for countries spanning the range of parties to the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) for 
the period 1972-1999, found on average near unitary income elasticity of energy demand. Joyeux & 
Ripple (2011) also conclude long-term unitary income elasticity of energy demand in OECD countries 
for 1973-2007. 
 (c) The relationship between energy prices and the wider economy
More widely, the relationships between energy consumption, price and economic growth continues to 
be a subject of substantial and nuanced debate.1  A huge literature on energy price-GDP relationships 
emerged since the oil shocks, with relatively little consensus beyond the fact that the 1970s oil shocks 
unquestionably hurt all the major, energy-importing economies (notably the US). Dispute remains about 
causality of oil-GDP relationships, as the direct cost impacts are insufficient to explain recessionary 
effects; but econometric studies have found significant recessionary effects attributable to the oil price 
impacts of the First (1990) and Second (2002-3) Gulf Wars.  The high international oil prices of 2007-8 
were again followed by global economic downturn, though attempts to attribute this to oil prices have 
not surprisingly been far more contested.2
More broadly, Fizane and Court (2016) note four different hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between energy and economic growth: (i) causal running from energy to economic; (ii) causal running 
the other way round – from economy to energy; (iii) two-way feedback between these two; and (iv) no 
relationship.  Somewhat ruefully they concluded: “Unfortunately, after more than forty years of research 
and despite the increasing sophistication of econometric studies, this area of study has not so far led to 
either general methodological agreement or a preference for any of the four positions. More specifically, 
three independent literature reviews (Chen et al, 2012; Omri, 2014; Kalimeris et al.,2014), covering 
respectively 39,48, and 158 studies, have shown that no particular consensus has emerged from this 
empirical literature and that the share of each assumption ranges from 20% to 30% of the total.”
They offer various possible reasons for this lack of clarity. We note that interpretation is further confused 
by the fact that much of this literature does not distinguish between shock (dislocation) and slower 
changes; or between the impact of international energy price changes (and the consequent international 
flow of finance), as compared to domestic impacts on energy prices, such as taxation. One would 
presume the economic impact is very different depending on whether the changes are sudden or 
gradual, and whether additional consumer expenditure goes abroad or stays within the economy. 
Indeed, econometric modeling projections have suggested that energy taxes can be associated with 
enhanced macro-economic performance (though like much else, this remains disputed – not least of 
course because it depends upon how the money raised is used).
In the context of this report, the interest is potential impact of extremes – exceptional levels of energy 
expenditures. There seems to be stronger evidence – endorsed in the Fizane and Court paper – that 
unusually high levels of energy expenditure do have increasingly adverse macro-economic (and social) 
impacts. An excessive cost share can provoke a recession – particularly if it is sudden, and if the 
additional expenditure goes abroad, which tend to go together. The long timescale of energy sector 
adjustment – which are underlined by analysis in this report - can then mean several years of dislocation 
and adjustment at a time when the economy is already stressed by fiscal outflow. 
1 See Huang, Hwang & Yang (2008), Joyeux & Ripple (2011), Chen, Chen & Chen (2012), Omri (2014) and Kalimeris, Richardson & Bithas 
(2014) for some overviews of the literature.
2 From the early 2000s, the oil price rise was less abrupt and most of the rich economies were more insulated (by many factors including 
high domestic oil taxation, which provides a buffer, and less dependence on manufacturing), and the recession was driven mainly by the 
credit crunch of accumulated debt. One view is that the impact of rising oil prices on inflation prompted central banks to raise interest 
rates, and it is this that slows the economy and amplifies debt problems (see Segal, 2011). The most extensive set of papers analysing oil 
price variations, financial speculation, and the historical impacts on GDP are collected in a Special Issue of the Energy Journal (M. Manera 
(ed), ‘Financial  speculation in the oil markets and the determinants of the price of oil’, Energy Journal, Vol 34 no.3, 2013).  The associated 
analysis of GDP impacts is by Morana (2013).
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 (d) Long-run & cross-country expenditure estimates
In the earlier studies cited, examining energy expenditure as a proportion of total income across income 
groups may be reasonably used to approximate income elasticity of energy demand. These studies 
focussed on a single sector (i.e. households), in a single country, for a static time period. As such, the 
energy products consumed, associated prices and conversion processes (e.g. lighting and heating 
technologies) were likely to be relatively uniform. 
For the latter studies however, with economy wide, cross-country examination, such a direct link 
between income elasticity and energy expenditure as a proportion of income might not be immediately 
expected. For example, energy intensity - the number of units of primary energy consumed per unit of 
GDP produced - varies substantially across countries, as we examine more closely in this paper. 
Literature examining long-run energy expenditure across entities – countries or groups – appears 
relatively scarce, and recent. Bardazzi et al. (2015) reports that for 3,425 firms and near 19,000 
observations in Italy for 2000-2005, energy expenditure as a proportion of gross output falls in the 
range 3.8-6.2%. Panel data for 6,808 firms, with 54,963 observations for 1992-2012 in India show that 
the share of energy costs was between 3.3% and 8.7% of the value of total revenue, across the sample 
(Sadath and Acharya, 2015). For households in Japan, India and the USA, Bashmakov (2007) found 
that expenditure on housing (i.e. building) energy from 1960 to 2007 has remained stable over time, 
but also at a similar rate, at between 2% and 5% of total (pre-tax) personal income. Data presented for 
China, the EU and Russia for the latter years also fall within this range. 
At the national, whole-economy level, Bashmakov (2007) also finds that energy expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP is within the range 6-11% for the USA between 1949 and 2007, and 8-15% for 
the OECD between 1978-2007 (with ‘sustainable’ ranges of 8-10% and 9-11%, respectively). These 
results led to the articulation of his first law of energy transitions: ‘in the long-term, energy costs to 
income ratios are relatively stable with just a very limited sustainable fluctuation range’ (see Annex II for 
brief reference to Bashmakov’s other two Laws of energy development).  
There are two approaches for energy cost accounting: energy costs for final users (applied in this 
paper); or primary energy costs applied by King et al (2015) and Fizaine and Court (2016). They 
calculate not consumer, but primary energy costs multiplying primary energy use for each resource 
by corresponding energy price. This method ignores additional value of secondary energy resources 
(enriched coal, petroleum products, heat, fossil fuel electricity, and delivery costs including transmission 
and distribution of energy) as well as much of taxes collected at the point of secondary energy sale.
On this basis, King, Maxwell & Donovan (2015) estimate energy expenditures as a proportion of GDP for 
the 44 OECD countries, representing 93-95% of gross world product (GWP), and 73-79% of the IEA’s 
listed Total Primary Energy Supply (TEPS) (>78% after 1994), for 1978-2010. They estimate average 
energy expenditure to GDP ratio for all IEA countries of 6.3% over this time period, ranging from a 
maximum of 10.3% in 1979, to a minimum of 3% in 1998. 
Most recently, Fizane and Court (2016) estimate an average expenditure ratio for 1850 to 2012 of 
approximately 6-7% – however, US values are used as proxies for global data, which as indicated by 
the authors, is a ‘coarse assumption’, ignoring what are likely substantial differences across the world). 
Building on data provided by Fouquet (2008, 2011, 2014), they also estimated the energy expenditure 
to GDP ratio for the UK, for the period 1300-2008. 
However, as highlighted by Bashmakov (2007), determining energy consumption patterns and volumes 
(along with prices, expenditure and GDP) for such a timeframe is highly speculative - not least due to 
the radical change in how energy is sourced, transformed and used (e.g. food supplied to labourers 
and fodder supplied to draft animals used for productive purposes). Combined, these factors render 
the calculation of consistent, comparable values over such a time frame an extremely difficult task.
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 D) Accounting framework
Four factors determine the evolution of the energy costs to GDP ratio (Se):
Where E is energy consumption; PE is energy price; YR is GDP in constant prices; PY is GDP deflator; 
EI is GDP energy intensity; PER is real price of energy. Energy costs in an economy as a proportion of 
GDP may thus be reduced to two key factors: energy intensity of real GDP and real energy price. 
It is important to note that energy demand and energy intensity to price elasticities are different concepts. 
They coincide only when energy demand by income elasticity is unity. Specifically, if energy demand 
depends on income and energy price in is a log linear forms traditionally assumed, then expressing it in 
average annual growth rates T we get:
where Te is energy growth rate, Ty is income growth rate and Tp is  real energy price growth rate. The 
elasticity3 of energy intensity to real energy price (c) is: 
  
The evolution of energy demand and price elasticities along with fluctuating rates of income and price 
changes (Ty/Tp ratio) can make the apparent elasticity of energy intensity to real energy price for specific 
years very volatile. We illustrate this with respect to US data in the next section, and show how it seems 
to smooth and converge towards a long-term (cycle long) stability at around ‘minus one’, which is 
perhaps even more surprising in the light of all these fluctuations.  
For the energy cost ratio to remain stable in the long run across time and economies, an increase 
(decrease) in the price of energy or energy intensity of the economy across time and in different 
economies must be coupled by a proportional decrease (increase) in the other. As such, the derivative 
of the relationship between these two factors must be around minus 1. This is clearly closely related 
to the long-run price elasticity of energy intensity, though not identical due to other potential time-
related factors such as non-unitary income elasticity and exogenous technology trends. We return to 
these in Part V, where we also extend the equation above to consider the impact of exogenous drift in 
intensities, as we observe in the data, as for example caused by autonomous technical change.
Time-related trends should not however directly affect comparisons across countries for the same 
periods. From cross-country analysis, Newbery (2003), when examining the relationship between time-
averaged energy prices and economy-wide energy intensities for OECD countries for 1993-1999, finds 
a price elasticity of energy intensity of minus 1, with a 0.14 standard error. This relationship remains 
in the updated analysis presented by Grubb et al (2014), who, recognising Newbery’s contribution, 
rephrased Bashmakov’s ‘first law of energy transitions’ as the ‘Bashmakov-Newbery Constant of 
Energy Expenditure’. 
3 As David Stern has noted, there are many different uses of the term (price) elasticity.  In this report, we may use the term not in the strict 
econometric sense of an econometrically-estimated relationship in a formal model, but we argue that many of the correlations we identify 
are largely price-driven and thus closely related to the underlying concept of elasticity as a measure of price-related and causally linked 
response.  We do seek to emphasise in particular a distinction between price-elasticity of energy demand, and that of energy intensity.
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In the last part of this paper we discuss possible theoretical explanations for these findings.  First 
however, we explore the structure and robustness in more detail, given some apparent discrepancies in 
the literature. On the one hand several long-run and cross country analyses of the relationship between 
price and energy intensity / demand find elasticities close to -1, and explorations of expenditure in 
energy as a proportion of income or GDP tend to find relatively constant shares, also suggesting a -1 
elasticity. On the other hand, in studies such as Labandeira et al (2015), much lower elasticities are 
typically found, especially when looking at shorter time periods. If lower elasticities held, this would 
imply that higher unit energy costs do translate into higher bills.
In the following sections we examine historical energy expenditures and price data for the US, and then 
utilise a new dataset covering a range of other (mainly OECD) countries, with the aim of reaching more 
robust and consistent explanations that may reconcile time series and cross-country, and short and 
long term, findings.
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Part II. Long run trends in US energy prices, consumption 
and costs
Data for US real GDP from 1949-2014 were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Database, and data 
for US energy consumption for the same period were downloaded from the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). The EIA also provided data on total energy expenditure, but only from 1970 
onwards. To estimate prices, and hence to calculate energy expenditure, for the period 1949 – 1969, 
the EIA’s data on fossil fuel production prices and average electricity retail prices was used to create a 
harmonised energy price index for this period.
Overview of US data, 1949-2014
 
Figure 1: Implicit real price index (a), real GDP growth rate 3 year moving average (b), energy 
intensity (c) and share of energy expenditure as a percentage of real GDP (d), for the US, 1949-
2013.
This continuity of robust data enables us to analyse trends over the past sixty-five years, ie. since shortly 
after the end of the Second World War. Figure 1 illustrates, across panels a – d, four key indicators 
arising from this dataset. Panel (a) shows the implicit real energy price index in relation to the year 2000. 
It shows the effect of the oil price shocks in the 1970s, the steep increase in energy prices from the 
early 2000s, with the dip in prices from 2008-2009 following the global financial crisis.
Panel (b) shows the three-year moving average growth rate of GDP. The concurrence with the same 
historical events can be discerned in this panel, with steep falls in GDP growth rates after 1973, 1979 
and 2008, with GDP growth briefly going negative in 2009 and 2010. As noted in Part 1, causality is 
broadly accepted for the 1970s oil shocks – when US energy expenditure first jumped from about 8% 
to over 10%, and then subsequently (1979) to over 13%, but remains much more contested for the 
post-2005 price rises (when US expenditure only briefly touched 10%).  
Panel (c) shows energy intensity, as the ratio between and energy consumption and real GDP in year 
2009 dollars. It shows that energy intensity declined over the period, with a marked acceleration from 
the 1970s oil shocks. 
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Finally, panel (d) shows energy expenditure as a share of real GDP. The shape of the energy expenditure 
curve (d) is reminiscent of the real price index, with clear spikes in energy expenditure corresponding 
to the price spikes visible in (a). However, whereas the real price index rises from 80 to 140 over the 
period, the share of energy expenditure declines from 12% to 8%. While short-term price rises do of 
course increase the share of energy expenditure for a period, the overall long term trend has been for 
the share of energy expenditure to decrease, even as real prices rise. 
The energy costs to GDP ratio shows a cyclic evolution with limited degrees of sustainable variation. 
After the upper limit is reached or exceeded (1949–1952, 1974–1985, 2008-2014), the ratio drops, 
and after the lower limit is approached (1965-1973 and 1993–2003), it, on the contrary, grows. Like a 
pendulum, the ratio driven by some economic ‘gravitation’ every time gets back to the equilibrium, or 
to the zone of sustainable dynamics. 
For the past 30 years (from c. 1983) the US energy expenditure ratio has fluctuated within a relatively 
narrow range around a mean of 8% - much of this time within +/- 1 percentage point, and only briefly 
declining to 6% (1999) and rising to 10% (2007).  This is despite a doubling of real energy price over 
that eight-year period, to levels exceeding even the peaks of the 1970s. 
Initially, this apparent corridor of energy expenditure was considered stable (Bashmakov, 2007).  With 
the 65-year timeframe, a general slow decline trend (by about 0.4% for every 10 years) can be observed.
To interpret the data from a historical perspective, it is likely that the 12% share of expenditure on 
energy at the start of the time period covered by the dataset is atypical for the period as a whole, and 
is due to the economic structure of the US in the immediate post-war period, still with the high outputs 
from energy-intensive industry which had been scaled up in part due to the war effort. A subsequent 
steady decline in the energy share of expenditure, reaching about 8% in the mid-1960s, may then be a 
part of a broader story of economic restructuring, which we consider at the end of this Part II in looking 
at trade shifts.  
Broad shape of the energy-GDP relationship
As noted in the literature review of Part 1, there is already vast literature exploring the relationship 
between energy prices and economic growth, with much of it focused on the US economy and the 
oils shocks.  We cannot add to this literature in its general and (as noted) inconclusive debate about 
energy-GDP relationships. We do however note a strong tendency in the literature – supported by the 
US data here – to suggest that very high levels of relative energy expenditure become increasingly 
damaging to economic growth. Fizane and Court (2016) strongly support this view and add to the 
chorus of argument that energy expenditures above about 10-12% become increasingly stressful and 
damaging to economic growth. The rationale is that only a portion of economic agents’ revenues and 
attracted financing may be allocated for purchasing energy: apart from energy, they have to purchase 
other production factors or meet other basic needs. When the energy cost/GDP ratio approaches the 
upper threshold, purchasing power is increasingly constrained (and so is the growth of real energy 
suppliers’ revenues)4.  The implication is a non-linear relationship. 
The reverse may also be true: as we note in our data, there is not a year within 1949-2014, when 
the growth rates in the U.S. were below 2%, and the energy cost to GDP ratio was low.  This may, 
of course, reflect causality in the opposite direction: rapid growth in GDP increases the denominator 
of energy/GDP, and tends to be associated with rapid declines in energy intensity as new stock is 
introduced. The observation from Figure 1 is that improvements in US energy intensity slowed, but did 
not reverse, in periods of very low prices.
4 Bashmakov (2007) estimates that after energy costs share of US GDP exceeds 11%, every 1% of energy costs increment reduces GDP 
growth by 1%. Fizaine and Court (2016) also suggest that for the US economic growth is severely impacted that after energy cost share 
reaches 11%.  At a high enough cost, elasticity of substitution declines to zero, and the production function is transformed into Leontief’s 
production function with energy shortage limits to growth. 
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Price cycles, adjustment timescales and expenditure
A key issue for exploration is adjustment timescales. As noted in Part 1 on concepts, both the price 
and changes in energy intensity can be very volatile. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows wide 
changes in energy intensity changes from year to year fluctuating by serveral percentage points around 
the long-term mean of -1.43%/yr (the flat orange line) - though it is noteable that after the 1973 oil 
shock there were very few years of rising intensity. 
Figure 2: US energy price and annual intensity changes
Adofo et al (2013) amongst other emphasise that energy demand elasticities may be very sensitive 
to the time period of estimation.  Any insights therefore need to look well beyond annual changes. A 
simple indication of this may be obtained by averaging elasticities over different aggregation periods. 
This time-aggregated form of elasticity is illustrated for the US data in Figure 3, which depicts the 
evolution of this ‘aggregate elasticity’ over periods ranging from 10 to 50 years in decadal increments. 
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Figure 3: Estimated US energy intensity-price elasticities (average of annual correlations) as a 
function of aggregation period (moving average)
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This illustrates substantial instability over time in estimated US elasticities. Over periods even up to a 
couple of decades, particular economic conditions, or the effects of shocks can create widely varying 
elasticities, due to a wide range of possible factors.5 For this US data, however, the results converge 
towards ‘minus one’ more consistently over time periods of several decades. 
The extreme negative values relative to the immediate post-war years (the early 1950s) deserves 
particular mention. Comparison with panel (d) shows that the beginning and end years of this period 
happen to be amongst the highest (12%) and lowest (6%) years for shares of energy expenditure. This 
difference may be emphasised due to structural factors, as at the start of this period, shortly after the 
end of the Second World War, the US was at a level of industrialisation unusually high by comparison 
to most of the rest of the period. This may suggest the importance of economic structure on long-term 
price elasticities of energy intensity.
Table 1 offers a closer look at the cyclic pattern in terms of main component indices, divided between 
periods of rising and falling prices. When real energy prices grow, energy intensity declines faster, and 
the value of energy intensity to real energy prices elasticity is around -0.4  to -0.5 within these periods. 
When real energy prices decline, reductions in energy intensity do not cease - being driven by the 
technological progress, which is largely autonomous from the current prices and is largely inspired by 
delayed reactions to prior price shocks.  Given falling prices, the measured elasticity (including the linear 
trend) becomes positive (falling prices, still falling energy intensity), but the reduction intensity trend 
does slow down.
Table 1 - Relationship between US real energy prices and energy intensity in different periods
Sources: same as for Figure 1.
If a-quarter-to-third-of-a-century long cycles of energy costs/GDP ratio are considered (see Table 1), 
then US energy intensity declined about as much as real energy prices grow, with the correlation nearly 
equal to -1: the ‘minus one’ phenomenon. Complete adjustment to energy price shocks takes at 
least quarter of a century.  And overall over the fifty-year period, real energy prices doubled whilst 
intensity more than halved.
5 A period in which the elasticity is greater than minus one implies that energy’s share of expenditure is growing. This could be because 
energy consumers are insensitive to rising prices (as a result of which their bills are going up); because the structure of the economy is 
rebalancing in favour of energy intensive industries; or because of a contraction in GDP that is not immediately transferred to reduced 
energy consumption. A period in which elasticity is less than minus one implies that energy’s share of expenditure is falling; this could be 
because of structural changes away from energy intensive industries; “ratcheting” effects  - energy efficiency improvements undertaken 
as a result of price rises in a previous phase, which are continuing to have an effect in reducing energy intensity even while prices rise less 
steeply, stagnate or fall; or boosts to GDP that are not immediately transferred to increased energy consumption. 
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Finally with this dataset, Figure 4 shows the density plot of normalised energy expenditure compared 
against that of the price range.  The most striking features are the very rapid drop-off of observations 
outside of a core range - including the extent to which the high US prices during the two oil shocks, 
reflected in the right-hand peak of the cost distribution, is pulled back considerably in terms of the 
actual energy expenditure/GDP ratio.  
The mean over the full dataset was 8.8%, influenced as indicated not just by the period of high prices, 
but by the exceptional intensity in the immediate post-war years (we report specific range statistics in 
Annex II) . Since the mid 1950s, almost 80% of the observations lie within ±2 percentage points of the 
mean. The narrow range is reflected in the statistics, with the variance of the expenditure distribution 
(0.04) being less than half that of the price distribution (0.094). 
Figure 4: Distribution of US energy expenditure/GDP ratio and real energy price (relative to 
mean) over 1950-2014 
To conclude: the various forces have led to overall expenditure on energy being within a range significantly 
narrower than price fluctuations, but with a slow downward drift (averaging around 0.04 percentage 
points a year over the period) which we analyse next, punctuated by the oil shocks.  Excepting the 
immediate post-war period, energy expenditure has remained mostly in the range 7-10% of US GDP - 
despite energy prices fluctuating by over 100% during the two decadal periods of energy price shocks. 
In addition to behavioural and technological adaptations to energy price growth, other factors, such 
as economy slow down, structural shifts, production factors substitution, and inflation, get to work to 
bring long-term price-intensity correlation close to ‘minus one’. Whilst price shocks have undoubtedly 
had macro-economic impacts (in part because the oil shocks resulted in both dislocation and a flood 
of petrodollars’ outside the US), higher prices have not ultimately resulted in higher proportionate US 
energy expenditure – which has indeed declined.
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The impact of trade 
Almost all data on energy use, including the EIA data used above, are published on a territorial basis – 
the energy used in a given country. This is also the basis for almost all emissions inventory accounting. 
However, this neglects the effects of shifting trade patterns – not of energy itself, but of other goods and 
in particular commodities and manufactured products which have consumed energy in their production. 
A natural challenge to the findings above is to enquire to what extent some of the changes may be due 
to shifting trade patterns. 
To explore this, we used the database of the Carbon-CAP project, which compared and evaluated a 
number of different multi-region input-output databases of international trade, with a focus on energy 
and related carbon issues (www.carboncap.eu). In particular, it examined how much of the apparent 
reduction in CO2 emissions in industrialised countries has actually been due to ‘offshoring’ of energy-
intensive manufacturing to developing countries (Wood et al., 2017). 
The main results are reported for per-capita CO2 emissions in terms of the difference between ‘production’ 
(i.e. territorial) and ‘consumption’ (i.e. including emission transfers ‘embodied’ in the trade of goods), 
with results for the US shown in Figure 5.  Given the complexity of trade data, the latter could only 
be estimated from 1970. At this time the US was (still) a net exporter – with energy-intensive exports 
exceeding imports. The 1970s oil shocks led – with significant time lags - to some restructuring, and 
over 1985-1995 the US moved to being approximately neutral in terms of ‘embodied’ carbon transfers. 
After the mid 1990s however, with the scale of globalisation and the rise of China, the US became 
a net importer of energy-intensive goods and associated embodied carbon.  This peaked in 2005, 
just touching 10% net imports; it declined thereafter, more sharply as the financial crisis and global 
recession hit trade more heavily than domestic consumption. 
Figure 5: The impact of international trade on US CO2 emissions, 1960/70 - 2014
Source: Carbon-CAP data, www.carboncap.eu 
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In Figure 6 we show a rough estimate of how this might affect energy expenditures on a consumption 
basis – i.e. attributing energy costs to the energy used in manufacturing imports and exports. To do this 
fully would require detailing the structure of trade, which was beyond the scope of this study. However, 
we make an approximation by attributing the CO2 trade to a basket of coal, oil and electricity production 
associated with the traded goods, and applying the domestic prices of each fuel.  
For simplicity we assume an equal basket of these three energy sources (neglecting natural gas, which 
tends to be used predominantly for household uses so less relevant to embodied trade), and attribute 
US energy prices by fuel, as a proxy for how much the US would have spent, had the traded goods 
been manufactured in the US. 
Figure 6: US energy expenditure per unit GDP – proximate impact of including net imports
Interestingly, the results in Figure 6 appear to indicate that including trade effects on this basis removes 
the structural decline in US energy expenditure intensity, which is clearly centered on 8%, with no 
discernible trend. The exceptional peak of 1979 (over 12% on production basis) reflected in part 
the impact of high oil prices on an oil-intensive export sector; on a net consumption basis, energy 
expenditure since the 1970s has been almost entirely in the range 6-10% of GDP. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of US energy expenditure/GDP ratio and real energy price (relative to 
mean) over 1970-2014, including attributed to internationally traded goods
As before, in Figure 7 we show the distribution of energy expenditure/GDP ratio compared to the price 
range. This shows even more strikingly a sharp drop-off of relative energy expenditures at both ends of 
what is an even narrower range: the mean is 7.4%, with 80% of the years between 6 and 9%.  Again, 
this is reflected in the distributional statistics, with the variance of expenditure intensity (0.032) being 
less than half that of the price variance (0.71). 
Obviously, the above analysis does not amount to a formal econometric test of price-intensity elasticities 
that takes into account other potential factors.  We return to discuss the interpretations later in the paper. 
First, having presented the empirical fact that the range of US energy expenditures has apparently 
been strongly curtailed at both ends compared to the range of energy prices, we turn to consider the 
international evidence.
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Part III: Cross-country analysis of time-averaged energy 
expenditures 
Interpretation of a single country time series is inevitably complicated by a multitude of factors which 
change over time – rising income, exogenous technical changes, structural changes, etc.  In this 
section, therefore, we turn to consider cross-country evidence, comparing energy price and energy 
intensity of a range of different countries. 
Methodology and data 
Cross-country studies have been far sparser than time-series analyses, partly because of the difficult of 
assembling the required data – particularly on energy prices and expenditure. 
Aside from the US starting from 1850 (Fizaine and Court, 2016), there have been detailed studies 
published with long-time-series energy expenditure estimates for the UK (Fouquet, 2008 from 1500, 
Csereklyei et. al 2014 (from 1800), and Sweden from 1800 (Kander, 2002)).
Beyond this, the global conclusions of Fizane and Court (2016) for example are actually derived from 
the heroic assumption of extrapolating global from US prices.  For his first study, Bashmakov (2007) 
focused initially on US data and then on IEA data on energy prices and final energy use by sectors, as 
well as on national data for estimating the share of housing energy costs in personal income before 
tax. Newbery (2003) similarly assembled estimates that also gave useful insights but had significant 
limitations in data scope and time coverage.  
To explore the issues more robustly, we developed a new dataset on energy-related expenditure, for 
32 OECD countries, for the period 1971 – 2012. The dataset was built principally using data from IEA 
Extended Energy Balances and Energy Prices and Taxes datasets, supplemented by estimates on 
energy prices from proxies and external sources. Approximately 89% of total final energy consumption 
across the countries and period examined are covered by this approach, with assumptions made to 
correct for the remaining 11% for which data is not presently available. See Annex I for more information.
This dataset encompasses the oil shocks and the period of low international energy (particularly oil and 
gas) prices, but with wider variation of domestic energy prices due in particular to high gasoline taxes 
introduced in Europe and Japan during this period, alongside the legacy of extensive energy subsidies 
in some other parts of the world. Resulting prices by country are shown in Figure 8 (a).
For national insights we present results in the form used by Newbery (2003) and subsequently somewhat 
updated as presented in Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff (2014) – a plot of primary energy intensity (toe/
GDP) vs end-user energy prices per unit of primary consumption (calculated using data on end user 
prices and total final consumption per energy product and sector).  Results aggregated over the full 
period 1971 – 2014 are presented in Figure 8 (b). This shows the average consumer energy prices 
(y-axis) and how these related to the average energy intensity (x-axis), illustrating the extent to which 
the data embodies a wide range of both price (vertical scatter) and intensity (horizontal scatter, and the 
relationship between them. 
Energy expenditure is of course the product of energy intensity x price, and the thick (red) line shows 
the line of constant energy expenditure at the overall mean – the ‘minus 1’ line in terms of intensity price 
correlation (based on the average expenditure as a share of GDP across all countries for the period), 
which averaged around 8.2%.  Countries to the right / above that line spent more of the GDP than the 
average, those to the left / below spent less. Firgure 8 (c) presents the x-axis as energy productivity - 
the inverse of energy intensity presented in Figure 8 (b) - with lines to represent ECS values of 6%, 8% 
and 10%.
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Figure 8: Cross-country price analysis: (a) Average energy price evolution by country, (b) Average 
energy price and intensity by country, 1971-2012, (c) Energy Price vs Energy productivity, 1971-
2012
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The overall pattern
As expected, countries with higher average energy prices have lower energy intensity, but the extent of 
the relationship between price and energy intensity is striking. Most countries appear surprisingly close 
to the line of average energy expenditure. 
From an analytic perspective this is an important complement to the US data examined in Part 1, 
because – along with the obvious acceleration of energy intensity improvements after the oil shocks 
– it strongly suggests that the “-1” observation cannot be explained in terms of exogenous, time-
related technology improvements that happen to correlate with the transition to higher energy prices 
of the past 40 years; nor is it explicable (much) in terms of income elasticity. It does suggest price as 
a key determinant, not just a chance correlation (examined further and more formally with reference to 
econometric findings in Part V).
In fact, the findings are even more striking. The thinner (black) line shows the OLS regression line, in 
Figure 8 (b), for an exponential fit to the data. Over these 42 years and for this group of countries, there 
seems to be a clear tendency for those with higher energy prices to spend less on energy, per unit GDP. 
The best-fit line has an exponent of -0.67, with a good degree of statistical significance (R2 = 0.79). The 
implied elasticity is the inverse of the exponent: -1.5.  Correspondingly, those with the lowest energy 
prices actually spent more of their income on energy: taken at face value this seems to imply that 
energy prices twice as high were associated with, on aggregate, one-third of the energy intensity - 
consequently spending 30% less of their GDP on energy. 
These combined factors influence the global statistics of this dataset, which as with US are summarised 
in the form of the density plots shown in Figure 9.  The data overall show a wide range of price, and the 
spread of relative energy expenditure is much less, whilst still bigger than for the US-only data; and for 
this international dataset, are is clearly skewed to higher ends. 
Figure 9: Global distribution of energy expenditure / GDP and real energy price (relative to mean) 
across 30 IEA countries, 1971-2012 
Note: See Annex I for detail on data sources and country coverage 
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The global mean expenditure across the countries is 8.2% of GDP, with a wider 90%-ile range of 5.5 
– 11% - which as we now show is largely due to particular (and telling) anomalies on the high side, 
and to Mexico and the Netherlands on the low side. Again, these are all reflected in the statistics of 
the distribution, with the variance of relative energy expenditure (0.096) being just under half that of the 
price (0.198). 
National characteristics
In fact of course there is considerable variation between countries; the nature of the positions, and the 
deviations from the “-1” line, are telling. 
Most of the western European countries appear very close to the line of constant expenditure (12 of 
the EU-15, along with Japan, are within the lozenge indicated in Figure 8 (b) – as is the US.  Though 
energy prices in Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Austria and Ireland averaged more than twice those of the 
US during the period, they used less than half as much energy per unit of GDP. 
As noted, there are some outliers. The hydro-dominated countries with traditionally strong environmental 
concerns (notably Norway and Switzerland) spent less than the average; so did the Netherlands, Spain, 
and most of all Mexico, which is striking for its apparent combination of low prices and low energy 
intensity. 
National trends and the exceptionality of Eastern Europe.
In contrast, the countries of Eastern Europe were for the first half of this period largely centrally planned 
as part of the Soviet sphere, with artificially low energy prices as a result of energy subsidies during the 
period. However these did not deliver significant savings in energy expenditure, due to much higher 
energy intensity, at least as measured with these market exchange rates.   
The IEA data available only covered the four indicated, of which three (Czech and Slovak Republic, and 
Poland – the other being Hungary) are striking for having had, on average, twice the energy intensity 
of the US (and four times their western European counterparts). Figure 10 illustrates the evolution of 
% GDP energy expenditures since 1971 for the countries divided into four groups - North America, 
Western Europe, Asia-Pacific and these four countries of Eastern Europe (Turkey is excluded).
Figure 10: Energy Expenditure as a Proportion of GDP for Country Groupings  
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The Asia Pacific region started with the lowest expenditure but peaked the highest in 1980, but overall 
is close to the North American and European levels of energy expenditure which remained remarkably 
similar – within 1 percentage point - throughout the period.  Until around 1990, the Eastern Europe 
group followed a similar though flatter trajectory until around 1990: all four groups rose from around 
5-7% GDP in 1971 to a 1-year peak of 11-13% in 1980, before falling to around 7-8% in 1989. 
Overall, except for very brief interludes all the three groups of market economies stayed in the range 
8±2 %GDP energy expenditure throughout the 42 years, mostly in the lower half (6-8%), except for the 
few years of oil shocks of late 1970s – 1982 and after 2005. From the late 1980s however, the trend in 
Eastern Europe was radically different. 
The phases of the various countries can be seen more closely by looking at how patterns and positions 
evolved over time, divided into three periods: 
• 1971-1984 (high international energy prices)
• 1985-1999 (falling/low international energy prices)
• 2000-2012 (rising/high international energy prices)
Figure 11 (a-c) uses the cross-sectional scatter plots to show more about the evolution of price and 
intensities at the national level. The east European group in this dataset (Czech and Slovak republics 
and Poland) started with very low energy prices, largely shielded from the oil price shocks. Their energy 
efficiency slowly evolved up to the end of the 1990s, as global energy remained cheap, but still averaged 
expenditure around 8-10% of GDP to around 2002.  
Joining the EU in the mid 2000s, requiring a move to market-based energy systems at a time of sharply 
rising energy prices, provoked a major shock – energy expenditures increased dramatically, hitting 
over 16% from 2006-12. Their energy intensity did improve substantially, but not nearly fast enough to 
keep pace.  Again, this underlines the high degree of inertia in energy systems, so that countries with 
relatively large energy intensities suffer much more from energy price shocks.  
The opposite extremes are also striking.  In the first period, Switzerland was an outlier with exceptionally 
high energy prices; by the last period, it was spending less of its GDP on energy than almost any other 
country.  Table 2 presents the actual expenditures over these periods by countries, which are in turn 
presented graphically by Figure 12.
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Figure 11: Average energy price and intensity by country (a) 1971-1984 (b) 1985-99 (c) 200-2012
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Table 2 – Energy Expenditure per $1000 GDP
Figure 12: Energy Expenditure per $1000 GDP
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Aggregate characteristics with and without Eastern Europe
Table 2 summarises the results in terms of the OLS exponents and corresponding elasticities in these 
different periods. Table 3 repeats these results, excluding Central and Eastern European Countries.
Table 3 – OLS exponent and Elasticities
Table 4 – OLS exponent and Elasticities – Excluding CEE Countries (Poland, Czech Rep. and 
Slovak Rep.)
It appears that the cross-country elasticity was higher during periods of high prices, and in the first 
price shock this may have been masked by the central planning of the east European which insulated 
them from international prices. Nevertheless, the cross-country elasticity remains substantially bigger 
than (minus) one: even amongst the long-term OECD countries, those with more expensive energy do 
appear to end up spending less of their income on it.
Indeed, the east European countries significantly distort the overall distribution of Figure 9.  Across all 
30 countries over these 42 years, the mean expenditure/GDP ratio is 8.2%, with variance 9.6% and 
statistical skewness of 1.09.  If just these four east European countries are removed, the mean drops 
to 7.9%, the variance falls to 8.1%, and skewness to 0.79.  
The trade effect
As with the US analysis of the previous section, one potential important complicating factor here is 
international trade.  The period covered by the analysis – and particularly the second half of the overall 
period – was as noted characterised by growing globalisation and the rise of manufacturing in China. 
Many of the OECD countries became far greater importers of energy intensive goods (and associated 
embodied carbon) than the US.  
The simple expedient used to examine the impact of trade in the US analysis of Part 1 – making a 
crude assumption on the basket of fuels used to make manufacture these (net) imports, and prices 
at domestic energy prices, is likely to lead to much exaggerated estimates. This is not only because 
of the greater imports, but because higher energy prices in these countries means that attributing 
these prices to imports would result in far greater exaggeration of the actual energy costs imputed. 
After all, importing energy intensive goods from regions where energy is intrinsically cheaper is entirely 
appropriate, reflecting standard economics of comparative trade.  
Detailed analysis would need to break down imports by commodity, and make a reasonable proxy for 
the actual energy cost used in making those products. This is beyond the scope of this study.  All that 
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we can reasonably say is that looking at energy costs from such a consumption perspective, including 
imported goods, would presumably pull the line back towards “-1”, rather than the substantially greater 
numbers observed here, and further narrow the range of energy/GDP ratios amongst the market 
economies.
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Part IV: Theoretical explanations
Econometric evidence and the consistency of elasticity estimates
We started this report with a brief review of literature on energy elasticities.  We noted that the literature 
on the price elasticity of consumer energy demand underlines the increase of elasticity with time 
horizons, but the huge meta-analysis of Labandeira et al (2015) nevertheless suggests (from almost 
1000 estimates) long-term elasticities of energy demand of 0.6-0.66 in the ‘long run’.  
This seems to contrast with the price - energy-intensity correlations of the previous sections, particularly 
the simple cross-country results with implied cross-country elasticities apparently significantly greater 
than (minus) 1.
The vast majority of formal energy elasticity studies are limited to data since 1970. Econometric studies 
of much longer periods include Fouquet (2012) and Fouquet and Pearson (2012) for UK lighting and 
transport, and Stern and Kander (2012) for the Swedish economy. As reviewed by Saunders (2016), 
even these seem to generate similar numbers: “for lighting, price elasticities have remained relatively 
stable since 1900, averaging about –0.6; for transport, they remained highly stable since 1950 at about 
–0.7” - results which “reinforce the substitution elasticities measured by Stern and Kander (2012) for 
the Swedish economy as a whole (0.645 to 0.686).”
We can go some way towards reconciling the estimates from our introductory observation in Part 2 that 
several other potential factors contribute to observed price – intensity correlations: 
Income elasticity of energy demand. As noted, an income elasticity less than one would also lead to 
declining energy intensity over time. The literature on income elasticity is not conclusive. Many studies 
suggest it remains close to one. However there is some evidence that income elasticity declines as 
countries develop. Mir and Storm (2016) present evidence for this ‘decoupling’ – potentially leading to 
a ‘Kuznet’s curve’ relationship - though they go on to argue that this more hopeful outlook disappears 
if one takes account of trade. i.e. they argue that apparent declining income elasticity in fact can be 
ascribed to the outsourcing of manufacturing from OECD countries in recent decades (see also the 
response by Grubb et al (2016) on the trade effects in terms of embodied CO2).
6  
This could contribute to the observed US declining energy intensity.  But it is clearly at best only 
a modest part of the observed trend, given the clear impact of 1970s oil shocks and the fact that 
intensity improved more rapidly alongside the subsequently lower GDP growth rates.  It is also notable 
that many of the countries with higher energy prices as reviewed in the previous section are amongst 
the richer countries (certainly, compared to the CEE countries), so income elasticity effects could also 
plausibly influence the cross-country analysis. But even if the income elasticity were as low as 0.7, thus 
accounting for a decline of 0.3 in intensity as income doubles, it would still be insufficient to bring the 
observed cross-country elasticity below 1 even if countries at the extremes of high efficiency receive 
double the income.
Overall, income elasticity itself is thus appears to be at most a marginal contribution. 
Exogenous technology trends.  Exogenous technology improvements also could contribute to 
declining intensity over time (a relationship however complicated by energy-efficiency rebound effects), 
and hence apparent correlation when measured over time, given the broadly rising energy prices over 
the period considered in the US data.  One might also postulate that the countries with higher energy 
prices tend to be not only richer, but more advanced in their adoption of more efficient technologies, 
though this somewhat tenuous by way of explanation. 
6 Michael Grubb, Annela Anger-Kraavi, Igor Bashmakov, and Richard Wood (2016), ‘Carbon decoupling? Carbon emissions and 
economic growth - production vs consumption-based evidence’, Institute for New Economic Thought, https://www.ineteconomics.org/
perspectives/blog/carbon-decoupling 
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Neither of these factors offer strong explanations of the price – intensity relationships observed - 
particularly when it is acknowledged that technological change is itself influenced by price – and the 
associated limited range of energy expenditure. 
The Bashmakov-Newbery constant, particularly when adjusted for trade effects, appears to consistently 
gravitate around 8% of GDP with a range exceeding ±2 percentage points only in exceptional 
circumstance, for brief periods or in countries with exceptionally distorted (and transitional) conditions. 
Overall, the data cannot be primarily explained through factors of income elasticity or exogenous 
trends: there is good evidence that the collective impact of forces in the energy system drive long term 
adjustments that keep total bills within the ranges indicated, through price-related responses. 
In this section we explore two other dimensions, from this perspective:
• Theoretical rationales to expect price elasticities close to “-1”
• The limitations to this and complementary models that need to be explored in any more complete 
theory
Theoretical rationales for “Minus 1”
A price elasticity of (minus) 1 is familiar in high-level economic theory, as it is implicit in the popular, 
simple, Cobb-Douglas production function. If energy were specified as a separate input to economies, 
therefore, such a production function would indeed imply a price elasticity of -1.  Saunders (2015) notes 
that increasing literature pointing towards an energy intensity-price elasticity of -1 is very appealing from 
this perspective.
In terms of theoretical explanation however, “-1” from this perspective is a tautology - a product of 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas form - and not a theory of why it should be so.
From a physical/engineering perspective, a more fundamental argument is offered in a little-known 
paper by Lowe (2003).  He demonstrates that for an energy conversion system with multiple stages of 
energy transformation, the overall system elasticity should tend asymptotically to unity as the number 
of sub-systems increases, even if the component subsystems are inelastic (0 < ei < 1, for each step i 
in the chain).   
The rationale is simple (though his mathematical formulation isn’t): each step in the system offers 
another element of flexibility to respond to price changes in its inputs.  The final output is the sum of 
these flexibilities.  If the cost of primary input changes, how much of that price impact is transmitted 
depends on the flexibility of each step: 
• The more a given step of process energy efficiency can increase its efficiency or otherwise reduce 
dependence on the input in response to higher energy prices (the physical) – or the higher its 
elasticity (the economic perspective) - then the more it will mitigate the price transmitted along 
the chain; conversely
• The less that any physical step in the chain can change in response to higher price (the physical) 
– or the lower its elasticity (the economic perspective) - then the more the price will be passed 
on to the next step.
So a long enough chain of steps i with ei > 0 will gradually attenuate the price signal until it has been 
absorbed by multiple efficiency improvements (or substitutions) in components along the way. So for a 
long enough chain, the full system should tend to a price elasticity of (minus) one. 
Many energy conversion systems do in fact comprise multiple conversion stages. 
The rationale is not however confined to purely energy systems. If the concept of embodied energy (see 
Hammond and Jones, 2008) is applied to the wider economy, then it can be considered as a multi-
stage energy conversion system. When embodied energy analysis is applied, it means that changes in 
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material efficiency improvements also contribute to the process. Lowe’s conclusion becomes relevant 
to whole sectors of the economy, as becomes clear from applying the material balance method used 
to assess embodied energy.7 
The “minus one” effect thus has a logical foundation.  It is the result of the assumption that sub-systems 
efficiencies depend on input energy prices, linked in long supply or energy conversion chains. This 
mitigates price impacts at following stages. 
One apparent puzzle is that from this logic it appears impossible to generate elasticities greater than 
(minus) 1.  If a component (or cumulative response up to and including a component) has elasticity 
exceeding unity, it actually would reduce the price passed on, so the system would tend back to 
(minus) 1.  
However, considering dynamics of the system makes such an outcome quite plausible, because few 
responses are likely to be instantaneous.  If later stages in the chain can respond faster than earlier 
stages, they may ‘overshoot’ their response; when the upstream stages finally adjust, the result is 
indeed an overall reduction in the final cost.  
If the downstream gains are reversible, the higher system wide response starts declining asymptotically 
from that new level back to a response of “-1”.  However, if the downstream improvements are sticky 
(e.g. due to innovation) and do not then reverse, this offers a physical context for a strong form of 
‘Porter’s Hypothesis’ in which an increase in raw input costs leads to an overall long term improvement. 
One might cautiously interpret the Swiss example noted above – having apparently endured in the 
1970s with amongst the highest energy costs, and now spending substantially less than the norm on 
energy – as such an example. 
Limitations and complementary models
This of course is a theoretical construct, and the data we have shown are more complex, in particular 
in suggesting not a full constancy of energy expenditures, but rather a range, and very long timescales 
of overall response.  
The corresponding implications are (a) that responses are much stronger at extremes of prices: that 
high prices provoke a disproportionate degree of efficiency improvement, whilst the cost of energy 
inputs may be virtually ignored if the price is low enough, slowing and even reversing gains in energy; 
and that (b) more attention is needed to the dynamics of responses.  Lowe’s approach hints at some of 
these issues, but this just emphasizes the need to look at more sophisticated model structures. 
We conclude that the explanatory power of the normal economic assumptions are constrained by the 
attempt to impose fixed parameters – fixed elasticities of price or income, or exogenous technology 
change – on what is actually a more complex and non-linear set of responses.  This reflects our 
suggestion in the US study that the evidence points towards different “elastic phases”.
In particular, there are three kinds of approaches – not exclusive of each other – which could more fully 
explain the observations: 
7 
where m – is share of production process loss; Xi – masses of input materials; ai – specific embodied energy use per unit of input 
materials; Pe – energy directly used in given production process; Pe – the transport energy of the final product.  This insight on the wider 
application of Lowe’s idea is from Igor Bashmakov.
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Asymmetric (1-way) elasticities 
Asymmetric elasticities were first formalised by Dargay and Gately (1995). They reflected on the apparent 
observation that the rapid decline in energy intensity in response to the oil shocks was not in any way 
matched by an equivalent increase when the price fell.  They argued that many of the responses were 
essentially irreversible – embodied in more efficient equipment and capital stock (including closure 
of antiquated inefficient stock), and econometrically tested a model that involved 3 terms: different 
elasticities in response to rising or falling prices, plus a 1-way additional response when price rose 
above previous levels.  
Box 1: Bashmakov (2016) approach to asymmetric price change 
If energy demand is a log linear function of income and energy price, then by expressing it in average 
annual growth rates (Te) we get:                                            , where:
 Ty is income growth rate, and 
 Tp is real energy price growth rate. 
Elasticity of energy intensity to real energy price (c) is:
                                               (8)
If there is some autonomous technological progress driving energy demand down                , then:
. Energy intensity to real energy price elasticity is a function of energy demand price elasticity corrected 
for income elasticity and for the ratio of average annual income growth rates to average annual real 
energy prices growth rates. Assuming  (     = 0), these two elasticities are equal only when either Ty=0, 
or a=1. According to the theory, b is negative. Ty and Tp can be either positive or negative. 
• If a<1, and both Ty and Tp are positive, then c<b.
• When energy prices decline, or Tp is negative, then c>b. 
• During price shocks, when Tp is very large and Ty is relatively small, and so Ty/Tp is very low, 
c          b. 
So mostly the sign of Tp defines the sign of the first component, when a is given, and therefore the 
relationship between c and b. Due to the instability of the Ty/Tp, elasticity c is not constant and evolves 
as both energy prices and rates of economic growth or income cyclically fluctuate. 
In the general case, both a and b are not constant across time so that evolution of energy demand 
elasticities along with the Ty/Tp ratio influence the dynamics of the real energy price elasticity of energy 
intensity therefore making its long-term (cycle-long) stability at ‘minus one’ even more striking.
Only whole cycle-long real energy price elasticity of energy intensity (very-long-term elasticity) is equal to 
-1. For time series that start and end in different cycle phases, c can vary a lot with given b, depending 
on combinations of the parameters of equation (8). 
For the ‘minus one’ phenomenon,                                       , and therefore                                        .
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If the whole cycle-long time frame is taken, then for the U.S. the ratio of GDP growth rates to real energy 
prices growth rates was 2.7 in 1963-1986, 1.5 in 1963-2014, and 1.9 in 1963-2014 (Table 1). So in 
the long-term in the U.S. b≈1-2a, but the coefficient preceding a was different for the two cycles. For 
OECD-Europe, this ratio for 1981-2013 was 2 as well (based on the data from IEA, 2014a; and IEA, 
2014b). 
A modest literature continued (not to be confused with other literature on different aspects of asymmetric 
price responses).8 Recent empirical and modeling literature on asymmetric price reactions explains 
the asymmetry effect through an uneven technological and behavioral change under different energy 
price changes (Huntington, 2003; Gately and Huntington, 2002; Griffin and Shulman, 2005; Jimenez-
Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005) through different consumers’ reaction to the 3 energy price components 
with live memories of previous price maximums while making investment and management decisions, 
different perception of, and reaction to, price declines and price recoveries after declines (Adeyemi 
and Hunt, 2014), risk aversion of human nature (van de Ven and Fouquet, 2014), as well as through 
purchasing power thresholds, which drive the uneven technological and behavioral change and impact 
economic activity (Bashmakov, 2007). All those factors may be important.
Much of this literature has been focused around the specific 3-term formulation of Dargay and Gately 
(1995).  Bashmakov (2016) considers another approach to asymmetric energy intensity response to 
price changes, as summarised in Box 1.
Stochastic Structural Time Series Models (STSMs) 
STSMs which were introduced by Harvey (1989) involve stochastic changes in two trend components, 
i.e. the level and slope of the variable in question, in ways that reflect path-dependence since they 
always refer to changes at time t relative to t-1.  This can be interpreted as representing for example 
enduring structural and technological changes in the system. 
Agnolucci (2010) adopted the principle of General to Specific econometric modelling – to start with a 
very general unconstrained model form which could describe observed data, and reduce it in complexity 
by eliminating statistically non-significant variables and trend components. He applied this to data on 
UK energy demand in both domestic and industrial sectors. He found that ‘Stochastic trends are rather 
important, whilst the hypothesis of symmetric price effects could not be necessarily rejected when 
using the price decomposition of Dargay and Gately (1995). However, the stochastic trend was itself 
found to be quite correlated with price changes.  
Moreover, both the asymmetric elasticity and the STSM formulations involve path-dependence – the 
energy demand in one period being contingent upon the prior trajectory. There was no reasonable fit of 
the data without drawing on one of these – so a degree of path dependence is intrinsic to Agnolucci’s 
findings.  Moreover he found that the two specifications can act as substitutes at least in the industrial 
sector - where response was found to be strongly influenced by price.  
This finding would create an equilibrium correction mechanism for the energy expenditure share, 
implying an upper and lower bound for the ratio. In the presence of exceptionally high prices, for 
example, an increase in energy expenditure would be tempered and eventually reversed by permanent 
improvements in energy intensity, represented by the stochastic trend, contributing to push the ratio 
back towards its long-run equilibrium.  In the industrial sector these adjustments could, of course, 
include structural changes that result in growing imports from regions with lower energy costs – which 
itself a way of containing energy costs grounded in standard principles of trade economics, that regions 
with intrinsically higher energy costs do well to specialise in activities other than energy-intensive 
manufacturing. 
In the domestic sector, Agnolucci found that ‘the effect of price in domestic energy use is markedly 
smaller’ – and that ‘the stochastic trend in the domestic sector is mainly shaped by factors other 
8 Notably, literature on corporate responses in passing through rising input costs but failing to pass declining input costs on to customers, 
more commonly known as final prices ‘rising like a rocket but falling like a feather’. 
An exploration of energy cost, ranges limits and adjustment process
37
than energy price.’  And, that ‘after 1995 … the diffusion of efficiency standards caught up with the 
increased number of appliances, hence a decreasing trend of energy intensity in the latter half of 1990s 
despite still declining energy prices.
Non-linear price elasticities and inequality 
The actual shape of the data observed in this study – a range of energy expenditures (estimated to be 
stable only in the range 8±2 %GDP after accounting for trade effects) with relatively sharp cutoffs on 
either side - suggests a non-linear response. Long-term elasticities closer to those cited in the literature 
(e.g. 0.5-0.7) may be applicable within this “normal” range, but they need to be accompanied by 
acknowledging several other factors: 
• When energy costs rise above this range, the economic impacts provoke much stronger 
responses, that act over time to bring energy costs back towards the B-N constant.
• Conversely, when energy costs are very low – particularly, below the low end – it may be that 
energy costs cease to become a factor in decision-making and the elasticity becomes very low.
Of course, the former response also reduces pressure on the energy supply markets, whilst the latter 
increases demand – thus, this pattern, combined with corresponding responses on the supply side of 
the energy industries, leads to the long-term cyclical nature of energy prices.
These two factors imply that energy elasticities are non-linear: the elasticity rises as prices and expenditures 
rise.  This in fact is not a new suggestion; literature over decades has raised this proposition9.   It has 
to a large degree been ignored in the wider modelling literature, however, presumably because of the 
added complexity – which is not a good reason to ignore a potentially crucial issue in long-run energy 
dynamics. 
In addition, an important third factor complicating assessments may be the role of energy-environmental 
policy, which may also reduce energy consumption during periods of ‘normal’ energy expenditure 
ranges, mimicking elasticities closer to “-1” – but then facing risk of growing rebound if and as they 
reduce energy expenditure to below the lower threshold. 
Such behavior is entirely consistent with the ‘Three Domains’ framework advanced in Grubb, Hourcade 
and Neuhoff (2014), which argues that the development of energy systems can only be understood by 
recognizing different domains of economic decision-processes: 
• The satisficing domain corresponds to low prices, strong dominance of behavioral effects 
etc., There is little change in industrial dynamics.  Improvements in energy intensity are due 
either to lagged technology effects or direct government policy on energy efficiency – once the 
technologies borne in previous eras have diffused, or the political impetus for enhanced energy 
efficiency dissipates, costs drift back up again despite low prices; hence the lower bound on 
energy costs.
• The markets domain reflects a zone of relatively constant elasticities, particularly in industrial 
energy use, but with limited structural change or radical innovation; consequently, the elasticities 
are also substantially reversible, and from the perspective of a particular fuel may be dominated 
by fuel substitution effects as relative fuel prices vary.
• The transforming domain occurs when energy prices rise sharply and/or peak at levels not 
9 Drifts of elasticity coefficients for energy demand functions have been observed by modelers since the early 1980’s (Kouris, 1981) and 
were initially (while the share of energy costs was on the rise) addressed through simple trend models (Girod, 1983). After energy price 
elasticity coefficients declined driven by the declining share of energy costs in the late 1980’s, it became clear that time was not a driver 
behind such evolution. Bashmakov (1988) developed an energy demand model with a dynamic price elasticity coefficient as a function 
of 3 years’ moving average real energy prices. So as energy prices grow, price elasticity coefficient escalates. Haas and Shipper (1998) 
showed that for many countries energy price elasticities are higher, when prices are growing. Ghalwash (2007) demonstrated that price 
elasticity for the tax portion of the energy price in Sweden is higher, than for its base part. 
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experienced for many years. The Dargay and Gately (1995) – inspired literature on asymmetric 
effects of peak prices points to strong technological, structural and behavioural impacts of such 
extreme prices – which are of course, themselves a reflection of the strong impetus to avoid 
economically-damaging levels of overall energy costs.  Or in the common phrase – necessity 
becomes the mother of invention (or of structural adjustment).
Following on from Bashmakov’s treatment of asymmetric price elasticities (see box above), depending 
on the model specification used to assess the parameters of the energy demand function, energy price 
asymmetries may reflect an ‘affordability threshold. In the extreme, the assumption that income and 
prices can vary independently in one-equation energy demand functions is no longer valid.’ 10 
Energy demand functions turn out to be functions with price-dependent elasticity factors. Particularly 
as upper bounds of the normal range of energy expenditure intensity are approached and exceeded, 
energy price growth is accompanied by price elasticity growth11.  
The Inequality Dimension
Finally, we pinpoint a crucial dimension of some of the above explanations, relevant both to understanding 
energy expenditure characteristics and the policy implications – namely inequality. 
Numerous data and studies have demonstrated that energy prices are regressive.  For example, Figure 
14 shows how although (a) energy expenditure increased across successively richer household deciles 
in the UK, the (b) relative expenditure, as a proportion of income, declined sharply. 
Figure 13: Energy expenditure and inequality: distribution of energy expenditure across UK 
households
The scale of the regressive pattern in UK household expenditure was relatively modest compared 
to some countries, and even poorest decile spent “only” about 8% of income on energy in 2008. 
Nevertheless, the energy price rises of the subsequent years made both environmental policy, and 
energy poverty, a political hot potato: the UK government defined “energy poverty” as spending more 
than 10% of income on energy, and soon found that several million households were breaching this. 
10 When the energy expenditure to GDP ratio is above the affordability threshold, . In other words, price elasticity 
grows absolutely by am. Parameter le may be also reflected in energy price elasticity, when the share of energy costs is high. 
11 The relation of tax collection to the tax rate and the function of housing and utility payments collection from residents (Bashmakov, 
2004a) are functions of the same class 
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This also sheds light on the nature of aggregate elasticities. Energy consumers may be grouped in 
deciles, based on the share of energy costs either in income or in gross output. The whole sector 
energy demand function may be presented as  , but every decile i may have a different 
response: Energy price elasticities can be different for each group and by absolute value positively 
depend on the share of energy costs: bi =f(Sei), and negatively depend on income. The overall energy 
price elasticity is a weighted sum of price elasticities specific for each group:                            . 12   
The greater the share of personal income (or indeed, corporate cost) devoted to energy, the stronger 
is the likely response to price rises.  Thus for example the numerous tales of the poor suffering (and 
sometimes dying) because they could not afford to heat their homes when energy prices rise – a 
response that the rich would never even consider. 
One might therefore expect groups with higher shares of energy costs to have higher energy price 
elasticity. If this is true, then when energy prices grow faster than income, the share of energy costs 
in income grows for all income groups. So each group may become more sensitive to energy prices, 
making each bi and thus total aggregated b higher, and vice-versa. This effect is illustrated in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Evolution of shares of specific energy costs by deciles and energy price elasticities
Source: authors.
If the energy price escalates by 50%, the share of energy costs grows by more percentage points for 
the decile with the highest energy costs, than for the one with the lowest energy costs (6.1% and 1.2% 
respectively, for the data in Figure 14)13.  Overall, distributional issues – in business as well as domestic 
sectors - may thus be important contributors to the asymmetry and drifting of energy price elasticity – 
and an important factor for policy consideration. 
12 Strictly, the groups may differ in their use of different fuels, so average prices may different systematically from the overall average 
economy price.  If the ratios of average energy price to the one specific for a given group is (  ): then  . 
13 This makes energy price elasticities higher for each group. The growth by absolute value is proportional to the increase in the share of 
energy costs and therefore uneven. Average price elasticity gets higher as well, but the weights of each group in the energy use change. 
Groups with high shares of energy costs and therefore high energy price elasticities reduce their consumption by a larger value compared 
to groups with lower shares of energy costs, and so the weight of the last ones increases. To a certain degree this effect mitigates the 
increase in average energy price elasticity. So might the behavioral characteristics of poverty sometimes cited as a reason why poor 
people don’t always respond actively to opportunities to save money – but this hardly mitigates the need to pay attention to the equity 
dimensions of energy prices.Some similar effects may arise with industrial energy use. Some of the least energy efficient companies may 
lose profit margin entirely, so reducing the load of the most energy intensive equipment or stop operation of the whole facility. Should this 
happen, energy demand will be cut further, increasing the price elasticity. The reverse is also true: if energy prices are 1.5-fold reduced, 
every income (or energy efficiency) decile faces declining price elasticity, profit margins grow, previously unloaded facilities may get back 
to work (rebound effect), and average price elasticity declines. 
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Part V: Policy implications 
Subsidies and taxes: evidence and narratives
This is not a policy paper, but we offer some outline policy conclusions from our analysis of the apparent 
relative constancy of energy expenditures – of which we suggest there may be many. 
Subsidies. Perhaps the most obvious is that it strengthens further the macro-economic arguments 
against consumer energy subsidies. Our dataset only included a limited number of east European 
countries, but the evidence from these is striking: the philosophy that subsidising energy was good for 
social welfare and economic in fact achieved the precise opposite.  It led to deep structural inefficiencies 
in energy use, and as the cost of the subsidies could no longer be supported – and the countries 
moved to market economics as part of EU Accession – the countries ended up spending more than 
the Bashmakov-Newbery constant of energy expenditure.  Particularly as global energy prices rose, 
this involved crippling social and economic costs. 
Taxes/environmental pricing.  The flipside of this is that, at least on the surface, the B-N constant offers a 
new angle on energy taxation and environmental pricing.  Governments in Europe and Japan managed 
to introduce excise taxes, but only during the 1980s in the wake of OPEC-induced prices rises which 
had enhanced energy efficiency, reduced oil dependence, and conditioned publics to higher price 
regimes.  Their acceptance was also enhanced by positioning these taxes in terms of improving energy 
security and reducing road congestion (directly through incentive effects, but more often, linked through 
using the revenues to improve road infrastructure).  
Even then, excise duties have remained sporadically controversial, particularly in the US, and more 
widely as global oil prices reached high levels again from around 2005.  History has also shown more 
emphatically the political difficulties faced by carbon pricing almost everywhere – people do not like 
paying more for their energy, particularly for components that were previously free. 
The observation of the B-N constant provides a new political angle on this because it suggests a focus 
on energy bills, not prices.  The narrative implied is not that prices must rise to reflect external costs 
and to force people to be less polluting; it is that prices can rise without people ultimately paying more 
for their energy. The historical evidence is that systems can adjust to higher prices so that people do 
not end up paying more. 
Not just prices 
There is however a very important qualification to this argument. The adjustment processes which 
explain the B-N constant in the face of high prices are painful, and mostly slow – we have shown 
that the full cycle can take at least 2-3 decades. And, it is precisely because high energy prices are 
economically painful that such a degree of adjustment does take place. 
From a political perspective, any government that tried to impose anything like the oil shocks of the 
1970s or late 2000s would not last long. As indicated, time and again, energy prices have proven to 
be politically sensitive, and even removing subsidies has been politically contentious and slow, whilst 
efforts at energy taxation have generally been even more so.  However hard politicians try to explain 
the evidence that in the long run the country and bills can adjust., “suffer now, it will be OK a couple 
of decades” is not an appealing political message. Moreover, it remains the fact that energy prices are 
economically regressive.  
Consequently, changing the narrative to focus on long run constancy of bills may be a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition.  The policy message of the B-N constant is not that governments can just impose 
carbon pricing and tell a better story about it.  Rather, to accompany carbon pricing, governments need 
to directly mimic the adjustment processes that lead to improved energy/carbon intensity. 
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On policy packages 
This perspective is consistent with (and implicit in) the “3 domains” framework and its explanatory 
power in relation to the data. The essence of the framework is that the energy system overall comprises 
multiple domains of decision-making, given the shorthand terms of satisficing, optimising, and 
transforming. It follows that policy aiming to fundamentally change energy systems needs to engage 
with the corresponding pillars of policy, as summarised in Figure 15, because different policies are most 
relevant to different domains of decision-processes. 
Figure 15: The Three Pillars of policy in relation to Three Domains of decision-processes
As a simple example; many of the cost-efficient opportunities for energy efficiency, typified in terms of 
the ‘energy efficiency gap’, reflect First Domain ‘satisficing’ behaviours in the broadest sense of the 
term.  If energy prices rise steeply, this may kick many actors to start paying attention to energy bills 
which had hitherto been ignored – an attention impact, leading them to stop wasting so much energy. 
But if those price rises are imposed by the actions of their own government, their other response would 
be to try and get rid of the government.   
To an important degree also, energy intensity could be reduced at lower cost by energy efficiency 
standards and/or well-targeted investment programmes (e.g. in buildings efficiency) and/or engagement 
programmes using ‘nudging’ & other messaging techniques.  Given the prevalence of satisficing 
behaviours in energy consumption, this would be likely to be both more efficient and more effective – at 
least in the short run. 
But in the longer term of course, the effectiveness of such policies would be undermined if nothing is 
done about energy prices, as the effect of reducing energy intensity alone would be to drive energy 
bills further and further below the B-N constant, amplifying satisficing effects and hence ‘rebound’.  It is 
correct to note that an elasticity of around “minus 1” implies constancy of energy bills.  As stressed by 
Saunders (2016) it also potentially implies a high degree of rebound.  
Moreover, the costs of energy efficiency programmes would rise with the level of ambition, whilst their 
economic viability (in terms of the value of energy saved) would decline. 
Whilst the issues around “rebound” are somewhat more complex than all this implies, a high elasticity 
does imply that energy efficiency may be more effective as a social policy than a policy purely to save 
energy.  
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The need for integrated policy packages 
Indeed, when we step back from the data analysis of Parts II and III of this report to compare against 
actual national policies, it is clear that governments have in practice always drawn upon multi-pillar 
policies and this in itself is part of the explanation of the B-N constant.  The low energy intensity of 
Japan and most EU-15 countries, for example, is not just because higher energy prices forced stronger 
consumer / investor responses, but because energy efficiency became a national goal: 
• Japan is well known as a global leader in industrial energy efficiency, with closely co-ordinated 
programmes between METI and industry, and its “top-runner” approach to self-ratcheting energy 
efficiency standards in vehicles, household appliances, and more, is widely acknowledged as 
amongst the most effective instruments for energy efficiency in the world.  
• The EU-15 countries similarly strengthened and expanded energy efficiency policies throughout 
the period covered by the data – particularly from the mid 1980s, as prices declined but 
environmental concerns started to drive energy policy.  These programmes spanned energy 
appliance labelling, rapid strengthening of building energy standards and later vehicle efficiency 
standards, and utility-based programmes for rolling out energy efficiency investments. 
Both these regions also invested heavily in more energy efficiency infrastructure, notably urban and 
intercity rail transport.  In both Japan and the EU, some of the funding for these ‘other pillars’ came 
from the energy sector – as with excise duties used to fund transport infrastructure, and utility-led 
energy efficiency programmes funded by levies on energy bills (also, increasingly, renewable energy 
programmes with tariffs again funded through charges on energy bills).  
Such observations in turn probably help to explain the econometric evidence of Agnolucci (2010), that 
whilst the ‘standard’ model of asymmetric price response cannot be statistically proven, trends in UK 
energy demand seem to embody a stochastic, path-dependent element which has driven enhanced 
energy efficiency in both domestic and industrial sectors, the latter with a stronger price-based element 
(as one would expect). 
Of course, some of the policies in Japan and western Europe were matched in some of the US, but more 
sporadically: in particular, after initial push in the Carter years of the late 1970s, US vehicle efficiency 
standards were effectively frozen for thirty years, whilst building efficiency standards remained weak or 
non-existent in many US states.  Low US energy prices weakened the incentive for government action 
on the other pillars; it has been the lower prices combined with weaker action across the other pillars 
that lie behind the high US energy intensity, and the paradox that the US energy expenditure is amongst 
the highest in the OECD despite it having amongst the lowest prices. 
The conclusion that the ‘Three Domains’ framework implies three distinct but interdependent pillars of 
policy is thus just as much a description of reality as an economic theory.  Overall, Grubb, Hourcade 
and Neuhofff (2014) conclude that none of the three pillars of policy is sufficient or stable on its own:14  
“Since the characteristics of energy systems and climate change span all three domains, changing course 
towards a low-carbon economy will involve working across all three pillars of policy simultaneously. 
Indeed, relying on a single domain or process is ultimately self-defeating:
• A focus purely on increased efficiency is clearly inadequate: success makes it cheaper to do 
things that consume energy or emit carbon, with the consequence of ‘rebound’ as people 
consume or do more in response. There are also likely to be diminishing benefits from efforts 
to bring us ever closer to the ‘best practice frontier’.  Only progress in the Second and Third 
Domains will then expand the scope for new cost-effective energy efficiency options.
• Relying on price alone is the favoured tool from the classical perspective, it maximises the 
14 The Planetary Economics book (Grubb,, Hourcade and Neuhoff 2014), in which the framework is developed and this excerpt written 
in the concluding chapter, focused particularly on the challenges of decarbonisation.  But the framework is general, and the conclusions 
apply equally to countries seeking to manage the other legs of the ‘energy trilemma’, concerning energy bills and energy security. 
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efficiency of market transactions. Yet it assumes conditions that are not satisfied in the first or 
third Domains, and political obstacles have hugely constrained the pace of introducing price 
measures. In the short run, the extent to which energy demand falls in response to price increases 
is limited (at least without complementary Pillar I policies) and the timescale of energy supply 
system responses to price changes can be decadal. Moreover, the failures in the innovation 
chain blunt any innovation response (“if the innovation chain is broken, energy/carbon pricing 
will not fix it.”).  The result is that rising prices hit consumers – who are voters as well – with rising 
costs, when they have very limited options to respond, and cannot readily identify or relate to the 
potential benefits, which are more distant and nebulous. Prices have the biggest distributional 
impact of almost any instrument, provoking strong opposition.  Relying on price alone risks 
generating more resistance than positive action.  
• Purely technology-driven approaches, applied without complementary measures, are also self-
defeating. Successful innovation requires a mix of push and pull forces, and that both are weak 
in the energy sector. If there is no market-based pull, technology programmes will have to be 
entirely driven by the government. The products of such innovation will compete with well-
established incumbents, which will be in a strong position to keep out new entrants. Without 
pricing, regulation, or actively engaged consumers, it is all push and no pull. Without pull there is 
little market; without a market, innovation will either wither, remain confined to the laboratory, or 
totally dependent on subsidy. Successful Pillar I and II policies are required to generate demand 
for low carbon products and processes.” 
Conclusions: implications for strategy, instruments and timing
The data covered in this report adds additional empirical evidence and insights to the idea of a relatively 
stable range of energy expenditure, which tends to gravitate back towards a range of 8±2 per cent of 
GDP.  This goes along with the implication that long-run energy elasticities are not constant, but are rather 
non-linear and/or asymmetric, with a collective impact tending towards “minus 1”.  This, as indicated, is 
all consistent with theoretical reasoning from multiple perspectives of energy chain interactions (Lowe 
2013), the Three Domains framework (Grubb et al 2014), and distributional considerations.  
Overall, this suggests that energy systems have considerable capacity to adapt to pressures – as most 
obviously expressed through energy prices - through combinations of several factors. Notably, in an 
environment of high price or supply risks, as characterised most obviously by the 1970s oil shocks and 
the policy aftermath, notably energy efficiency and structural changes which affect intensity, innovation, 
and supply-side changes, act to bring the overall energy cost back to within the range indicated. 
Conversely, exceptionally low prices induce waste, a slowdown of energy productivity and innovation, 
which leads costs back up again.  
However, we have also shown that the timescales of adjustment are long – to be measured in decades. 
Strategic implications and climate policy
In principle, this is a positive message which points to a large capacity of energy systems to adapt to 
prices and constraints given time, though it also points to the risks of high costs if either prices rise 
suddenly, or rapid changes are otherwise forced in to the system: the timescale of adjustment is just 
as important.  
In a separate analysis (Grubb, Mercure, Salas et al 2018), we present a formal terminology and 
mathematical approach to estimating some of the causal forces and evaluating systems with these 
characteristics, which we term pliable – capable of making enduring adaptions of technology, resource 
needs and structures, but requiring pressure to do so. 
One insight is that whilst the long-run costs of moving to a low carbon economy may be much lower 
for such systems, the initial effort justified in cost-benefit terms may be considerably higher. Moreover, 
the optimal trajectory may be completely different from that with systems with a more traditional cost 
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structure, tending towards a linear path of emission reductions as adjustments accumulate. 
Policy instruments and timing
The policy conclusions also go beyond suggesting a different pathway and narrative behind energy 
pricing (including carbon pricing) policies and a need to involve multiple policy instruments. The analysis 
also points towards crucial issues of timing, and the relationship between the different instruments. 
The traditional conception is that prices should drive improvements in efficiency and innovation through 
market mechanisms.  
Our logic throws serious doubt upon this. Notwithstanding the important caveats about interpreting 
economic impacts (see Part 1), energy costs above the range we have identified appear to involve 
increasingly high economic and welfare costs – and certainly, political obstacles.   
An exploration of energy cost, ranges limits and adjustment process
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Annex I – Cross-Country Data Methodology
Energy Consumption Data
Final energy consumption data is sourced from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Extended Energy 
Balances of OECD Countries Database. Data were retrieved for all end-use sectors (agriculture & 
forestry, fishing, commercial and public services, industry, residential and transport, plus ‘non-specified 
(other)’), for each of the energy products presented in Table 6, below. Energy products used for non-
energy purposes are excluded. Data were retrieved in tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), and for the period 
1971-2012. Although some data for 1970 and 2013 are available for the countries, energy products 
and sectors of interest, they are uncommon, and thus excluded from the analysis. Data for some OECD 
countries, including Israel, Turkey, Slovenia and Estonia were not available, and were also excluded. 
Non-OECD countries are also excluded to do the lack of comprehensive data. 
For some coal products, for some countries for the period 1971-1977, data were unavailable. In these 
instances, values were assumed to be the average value of the proceeding eight years (1978-1985). In 
many cases, these values are zero.
Table 5 presents the proportion of total final energy consumption covered by the sectors and energy 
products above for each country, as an average over the period 1971-2012.
Table 5 – Proportion of total final energy consumption covered by energy products with price data
The average of these values is 89%. The proportion of energy consumption not covered by these 
products is accounted for by those for which prices (or reasonable proxies) are not available, or which 
do not have not direct costs. This includes direct biomass (either purchased or directly sourced), 
biofuels, geothermal and solar thermal energy, and waste products used for direct energy. Such energy 
resources are are significant in some countries considered in this analysis, particularly in later years.
Energy Price Data
End user energy product prices were principally provided by the consultancy Cambridge Econometrics. 
This data is originally sourced from the IEA Energy Prices and Taxes database, and consists of the final 
price paid by the end user per unit of final energy product consumed, including taxes (but excluding 
any post-tax subsidies), for each country listed in Table 5. Data points not present in the IEA database 
are ‘gap filled’ by Cambridge Econometrics, mainly using price growth rates contained in the E3ME 
model, and those of proxy countries. Data were provided in US$/toe, current prices. Table 6, below, 
illustrates how different price categories were mapped to the energy product categories as defined by 
the IEA Extended Energy Balances. Sector abbreviations are as follows: Agriculture & Forestry (A&F), 
Commercial & Public Services (C&P), Fishing (F), Industry (I), Residential (R), Transport (T), Other (O).
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Table 6 – Energy products and associated price categories
*The US EIA15 provides annual average prices from sales by refiners for U.S kerosene type jet fuel, for 1978 
onward (in current prices). For 1971-1977, it is assumed that the annual value is equal to the average of the 
proceeding 8 years. For this analysis, it is assumed that these prices are applicable globally, for all jet fuel.
**Wener (2016) 16provides data on district heating prices for a range of countries from 1980 onwards (with varied 
temporal coverage for each country), in Euros (constant prices). For countries with data but without full temporal 
coverage, the average rate of change in absolute Euros across time for the data present is continued until a 
negative value is produced. The final non-negative value is then assumed to hold. For countries with no data, it is 
assumed annual prices are equal to the average of the price in countries for which data is available (or has been 
estimated using the method described above). Euros are then translated to US$ values using market exchange 
rates provided by Cambridge Econometrics, and as used in the E3ME model.
As illustrated in Table 6, proxy prices are used for a number of sub-products (particularly for coal 
products), due to the lack of available product-specific prices. However, in most instances, the price 
categories map directly to the energy product group or sub-categories that account for the greatest 
proportion of final energy consumption.
15 US EIA (2017) U.S. Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Retail Sales by Refiners, [Online] Available at: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/
LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=EMA_EPJK_PTG_NUS_DPG&f=M
16 Werner, S. (2016) European District Heating Price Series, Energiforsk, Sweden 
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Subsequent Calculations
The final consumption of each energy product (in toe) listed in Table 6 was multiplied by its associated 
price (in US$, current prices), with the product summed to produce total expenditure per country, 
per year. However, as illustrated by Table 5, this falls short of the total expenditure on all final energy 
consumption. To correct for this, the total expenditure value for each country and year was inflated 
under the assumption that the average price paid for the energy products not accounted for, for each 
year and each country, is 50% that of the average for products for which prices (or proxies) are available.
Annual values for each country were then converted to US$2005 values, using US GDP deflator values 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators Database (rebased from 2010 to 2016). Values 
for each year were then divided by the corresponding total primary energy consumption for each 
country (excluding non-energy use), to produce the average end user price per unit of primary energy 
consumption in the economy.
Energy intensity of the economy is calculated using primary energy consumption (excluding non-energy 
use) for each year and country, and corresponding GDP values (in US$2005, market exchange rates), 
also provided by the IEA’s Energy Balances of OECD Countries Database. 
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Annex II: Distributional statistics of Energy Cost Shares 
of GDP (ECSgdp)
Table 7 - US data analysis 
Summarises statistical results from US data analysis, indicating the exceptional impact of the immediate 
post-war years, and the nature and importance of trade effects in the (shorter) period for which consistent 
trade data are available. 
Key points: the reduction in upper end of ECS ranges from column 1 to 2 reflects the exceptional 
cost intensity of the post-war decade in which the US manufacturing was underpinning post-war 
reconstruction in Europe and Japan, with ECS values which were exceeded only for brief periods after 
the 1970s oil shocks.  The lower average in columns 3 & 4 reflects the observed downward long-term 
trend in ECS, due partly to trade shifts. The higher standard deviation and skewness of the territorial 
relative to consumption data (columns 3 vs 4) reflects in part that 1971-2012 covers the period of US 
shift from being a major net exporter to a net importer of energy intensive goods, and the consumption 
data appears to remove the declining ECSgdp trend. For fuller analysis, see Part II, and Figures 1 – 7. 
Table 8 - Panel analysis from IEA data
Key points: Comparison of the first and second and third columns illustrate the extreme ECSgdp 
numbers associated with some countries reporting of estimates from before they joined the OECD, 
and were at earlier stages of economic development.  In particular, some of these data points imply 
an exceptionally low ECS which we suspect may reflect inadequate or incomplete data. Rather than 
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examine country specifics, column 2 addresses this concern by only including data points from countries 
after joining the OECD, with its associated formalised statistical procedures. 
Comparison of the first and third columns illustrate the exceptional situation of the east European 
countries that had highly subsidised energy and resulting inefficiencies, but then in the 2000s faced 
pressures of market prices at a time of rising energy prices, both occurring on timescales much faster 
than the characteristic timescales of adjustment we indicate. This radically reduces the upper end of 
ECSgdp ranges as compared with the full dataset. For fuller analysis, see Part III, and Figures 8 – 12. 
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